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On actualist and fundamental public justification in political liberalism 
 
[Blinded version] 
 
Abstract: Public justification in political liberalism is often conceptualized in light of Rawls’s 
view of its role in a hypothetical well-ordered society as an ideal or idealizing form of 
justification that applies a putatively reasonable conception of political justice to political 
matters. But Rawls implicates a different idea of public justification in his doctrine of general 
reflective equilibrium. The paper engages this second, more fundamental idea. Public 
justification in this second sense is actualist and fundamental (rather than ideal or idealizing and 
conception-applying). It is actualist in that it fully enfranchises actual reasonable citizens. It is 
fundamental in that political liberalism qualifies conceptions of political justice as reasonable to 
begin with only if they can be accepted coherently by actual reasonable citizens. Together, these 
features invite the long-standing concern that actualist political liberalism is objectionably 
exclusionary. I argue that the exclusion objection, while plausible, is more problematic in its 
own right than it seems if actualist and fundamental public justification hypotheticalizes and 
discursive respect is compatible with substantive discursive inequality. This leaves proponents 
and critics of political liberalism with deeper questions about the nature of permissible 
discursive inequality in public justification. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent discussions of public justification in political liberalism often adopt a perspective that 
John Rawls foregrounds in his account of a well-ordered society at the second stage of his 
theory, Justice as Fairness (or JF):1 they discuss public justification with a focus on the stability 
of an idealized social order, while conceptualizing public justification in ideal terms and as 
applying a putatively reasonable conception of justice to political matters (I elaborate on this 
below). But a different idea of public justification is in play in Rawls‟s doctrine of general 
reflective equilibrium. This discussion explores this second, arguably more fundamental idea of 
public justification. I focus exclusively on first-generation, Rawls-type political liberalism (as 
advanced by Rawls and political liberals like Stephen Macedo or Charles Larmore),2 interpret its 
idea of public justification in light of the doctrine of general reflective equilibrium, and address 
limits of the idea so understood. On the reading suggested here, public justification, in one role, 
is actualist and fundamental (rather than ideal and conception-applying). It is actualist insofar as 
it fully enfranchises actual reasonable citizens. It is fundamental in that political liberalism 
counts conceptions of political justice, including JF, as reasonable in the first place only if they 
can equally be accepted coherently by actual reasonable citizens. Together, these features invite 
a familiar concern: since political liberalism from the ground up prioritizes the standpoint of 
citizens that it regards as reasonable, it seems objectionably exclusionary. I argue that this long-
standing objection–call it the exclusion objection–is more problematic in its own right than it 
                                                 
 
1 See Rawls 2001 and 2005; Weithman 2011, 2015 and 2017; Gaus 2011; see also the discussion of various 
stability-centric claims about the role of public reason in Lister 2017. 
2 Rawls 2001, 2005; Macedo 1991; Larmore 2015 and 2008, part II, and 1996, chapters 6 and 7.  
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seems if actualist and fundamental public justification hypotheticalizes and the kind of equal 
respect that public justification allocates to people allows for substantive discursive inequality–in 
a sense to be detailed later. This leaves proponents and critics of Rawls-type political liberalism 
with deeper questions about the nature of permissible discursive inequality in actualist public 
justification.3  
My discussion proceeds as follows. To elaborate further on my topic and aims, sections 2 
and 3 provide needed background. I distinguish two ideas of public justification and two ideas of 
equal respect in Rawls-type political liberalism (as I address only this kind of view, I often drop 
the qualifier “Rawls-type”). This discussion focuses on actualist (rather than ideal) public 
justification that reflects a conception-constraining (rather than conception-dependent) form of 
respect, namely, discursive respect (Besch 2014). Sections 4 and 5 read Rawls‟s doctrine of 
general reflective equilibrium as suggesting a requirement of actualist and fundamental public 
justifiability. Section 6 relates this to JF‟s Original Position (OP) and the aim of reasonable 
overlapping consensus. Section 7 contrasts the proposed reading with Jonathan Quong‟s reading 
of public justification in Rawls: both readings see public justification as fundamental in political 
liberalism, but they disagree about the nature of political liberalism‟s commitment to extend 
equal respect to reasonable people.  
Section 8 turns to the exclusion objection. In political liberalism, political legitimacy is a 
function of what is publicly justifiable to “reasonable” people, yet its idea of reasonableness 
seems parochial. Contrary to one line of criticism, this coheres with salient “public reason 
intuitions” (Enoch 2015, p. 114ff); but it still is objectionably exclusionary. Sections 9 and 10 
then consider whether hypotheticalization can accommodate the exclusion objection. To this end, 
I ask whether Larmore-type hypotheticalized actualist public justification (or LAJ) can model 
equal discursive respect. Two things emerge. First, LAJ can allocate discursive standing that is 
equal formally, but not substantively, or in terms of its discursive purchase (for now, think of 
discursive purchase as the measure of influence that an agent‟s discursive standing accords her in 
justification). Yet, second, LAJ nevertheless can model equal discursive respect if it allocates 
discursive standing that does not impermissibly differ in discursive purchase. LAJ‟s ability to 
model equal discursive respect hence turns on its ability to avoid impermissible substantive 
discursive inequality. As section 11 concludes, this marks a matter of concern not only for 
political liberalism, but for the wider family of conceptions of acceptability-based justification.  
 
2. Public justification and equal respect  
To say that a salient political thing, φ (e.g., exercises of political power, a political principle, or a 
conception of political justice), is publicly justifiable is to say, roughly, that φ is authoritatively 
acceptable by relevant people; alternatively, it is to say that φ is justifiable on the basis of public 
reasons, i.e., reasons that are so acceptable. In political liberalism, I assume, this standard refers 
to φ‟s equal acceptability by reasonable citizens, while the view that political things must be so 
acceptable reflects a view of what it takes to extend a form of equal respect to reasonable citizens 
                                                 
 
3 Actualist readings of public justification in Rawls-type political liberalism are around for a long time, but 
they rarely take it to be fundamental or focus on the political role of reflective equilibrium: see Hampton 1989 and 
1993; Campos 1994; Forst 1994; Wenar 1995; Estlund 1998; Besch 1998; Gaus 1999; Mulhall and Swift 1999; see 
also the notes to sections 4 and 5, below. The view suggested here develops further the “deep view” of public 
justification: see [omitted for blind review] and [omitted for blind review]. 
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in relation to such things. Yet political liberalism employs this standard in two roles–or, say, it 
adopts two ideas of public justification–and it puts to work two different ideas of equal respect. I 
address both things in turn. 
One role of the standard just mentioned is internal to Rawls‟s model of a well-ordered 
society. Within this model, public justification, or public reason giving that “aims for” public 
justification (Rawls 2005, p. 465), is carried out by the reasonable citizens of a society that is 
well-ordered by JF; these citizens accept JF as reasonable and they employ it as a shared basis of 
justification in matters of basic justice. If we understand things in such terms, to say that φ is 
publicly justifiable is to say something like:  
IJ For a society that is well-ordered by a conception of political justice, ψ, and for 
reasonable citizens of this society, who accept ψ as reasonable: φ is equally 
acceptable by all reasonable citizens on the basis of ψ, or ψ‟s values.  
Call public justification in this sense ideal justification: it is ideal in that it is situated in a 
hypothetical, ideal or idealized society and includes in its justificatory constituency on fully 
enfranchised footing only the hypothetical reasonable citizens of that society–citizens, moreover, 
who already accept a (putatively) reasonable conception of political justice and use it as a shared 
basis of justification. Where public justification is construed in such terms, it tends to be 
construed as conception-applying, i.e., as applying a (putatively) reasonable conception of 
political justice to salient political matters.  
 Needless to add, it can be a relevant result that a given political thing is IJ-justifiable, or 
that, for a given ψ, practices of IJ-justification could contribute to the stability of a well-ordered 
society, e.g., in relation to relevant assurance problems.4 But it is equally plain that there is more 
to the theme of public justification in political liberalism. Political liberals often refer to public 
justification as requiring equal acceptability by actual reasonable people in the actual world. So 
construed, the claim that φ is publicly justifiable becomes a claim like:  
AJ For the actual citizens of an actual Western democratic society: φ is equally 
acceptable by all reasonable citizens (or, perhaps, all citizens insofar as they are 
reasonable), or is justifiable by reasons that are. 
Public justification in this sense is actualist justification: the standard of public justification here 
applies to actual discursive practice, and public justification includes in its constituency on fully 
enfranchised footing actual reasonable people. (I address the role of AJ-justification in political 
liberalism in sections 3 and 4, and turn to Larmore‟s hypotheticalizing variant of AJ-justification 
in sections 9 and 10.)  
Two comments are called for. First, public justification in political liberalism 
enfranchises reasonable people, but there is little consensus in the field about the content of this 
idea of the reasonable. But we need not go into much detail: only two things matter now. First, 
reasonable citizens do not reject political liberalism‟s most important liberal political values 
(whatever exactly these are), although they might not also accept JF, as a token member of the 
                                                 
 
4 E.g., it is one concern of Quong‟s internal conception to show that JF itself would equally acceptable by 
the hypothetical reasonable citizens of JF‟s well-ordered society: see Quong 2011 and 2012. Gaus and Weithman 
foreground assurance problems: Gaus 2011, p. 315ff; Weithman 2011, chapter II.  
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family of political liberalism.5 Second, as proponents and critics of political liberalism alike 
observed, reasonableness is a complex virtue such that intelligent and conscientious citizens in 
good moral standing might not qualify as reasonable. This invites concerns about the 
inclusiveness of public justification, or lack thereof–I return to this below. 
Second, the distinction between IJ-justification and AJ-justification marks ideal types that 
are suggested by two roles of public justification in political liberalism. Beyond ideal types, it is 
not always straightforward whether a given conception of public justification instantiates, or 
leans toward, ideal or actualist justification. This is so not least because all acceptability-based 
justification hypotheticalizes, however minimally, and hence idealizes in one sense of the word 
(Enoch 2015; Besch 2019). For it must qualify the discursive input that it counts as authoritative, 
or as contributing to justification. E.g., to be authoritative, discursive input must be respectable, 
thoughtful, coherent, and so on. Correspondingly, there can be high-idealization actualist 
justification. E.g., we might take φ to be publicly justifiable to actual people here and now only if 
they could still accept φ if they were fully reasonable citizens of a well-ordered society. For now, 
though, I may simplify. Thus, I shall assume that public justification is construed as ideal if it is 
construed as situated in a hypothetical well-ordered society and as fully enfranchising only the 
hypothetical reasonable citizens of that society who accept a (putatively) reasonable conception 
of political justice. It is construed as actualist if it is construed as situated in an actual society and 
as fully enfranchising actual reasonable citizens who (qua reasonable) accept political 
liberalism‟s most important political values.  
A commitment to actualist justification is evident in the works of Macedo and Larmore. 
For Macedo, public justification aims to justify things on the basis of good reasons and it aims to 
respect reasonable citizens as free and equal–and Macedo takes the latter to call for justifications 
on grounds that are equally acceptable by actual reasonable people “such as they are” (Macedo 
1990, p. 281; Hadfield & Macedo 2012, p. 10). However, political liberalism construes the first 
aim from the perspective of the second: it defines the goodness of good, publicly justifying 
reasons as “entirely a function of their capacity to gain widespread agreement among reasonable 
people” (Macedo 1990, p. 282). This applies to actual reasonable people and all public reasons, 
including public reasons that establish principles of political justice as reasonable or exercises of 
political power as legitimate.  
Similarly, Larmore sees equal respect as the “moral basis of the liberal principle that the 
fundamental rules of political association are legitimate only if they can be the object of 
reasonable agreement” (Larmore 2015, p. 79). But for political liberalism, reasonable people are 
properly respected as equals only if the political principles that apply to them are as justifiable 
“to them from their perspective as they presumably are to us” (ibid, p. 78). This refers to 
reasonable people, including actual people, “to which such principles are to apply” (Larmore 
1996, p. 137), and it specifies a condition that all political principles must meet. 
Next, these two authors evidently do not take public justification to serve in a merely 
conception-applying role: rather than requiring equal acceptability only of (hypothetical) 
practices of reason giving that apply a given, putatively reasonable conception of political justice 
to salient political matters, they take it that such conceptions must be suitably acceptable by 
reasonable citizens, or be justifiable by reasons that are, to be reasonable in the first place.  
                                                 
 
5 For one account of reasonableness in Rawls-type public justification: see [omitted for blind review] and 
[omitted for blind review]. See also Enoch 2015.  
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Rawls, too, understands public justification along such lines. For Rawls, no conception of 
political justice is reasonable unless it is equally acceptable coherently by actual reasonable 
citizens, or so I claim. This in effect employs a requirement of public justifiability as a 
requirement of theory-selection in the domain of the political, and so applies it at a level of 
thought, argument, or decision-making that is fundamental in political liberalism‟s order of 
justification. To read political liberalism in such terms is to read it as a political constructivism 
that puts center stage an idea of actualist public justification. 
I now turn to equal respect, or two ideas of equal respect and two views of its relationship 
to public justification. One view comes with (but is not tied to) Rawls‟s model of a well-ordered 
society. The reasonable citizens of JF‟s well-ordered society respect each other as equals, but 
they look to JF, or its values of justice and public reason, to define what this calls for; and as JF 
prescribes that they comply with a duty of civility to engage in public reason giving in political 
matters, equal respect commits them to do so (Rawls 2001, p. 116f). This employs equal respect 
as a conception-dependent constraint–a constraint the content of which is defined by, or depends 
on, a (putatively) reasonable conception of political justice. To respect others accordingly is to 
respect them as recipients of justice, as defined accordingly; so construed, equal respect calls for 
public reason giving if a reasonable conception of political justice prescribes it.6  
On another, more republican or constructivist view, equal respect, rather than depending 
on a reasonable conception of justice, constrains what conceptions of justice count as reasonable 
to begin with. This employs equal respect in a conception-constraining role. On this view, or one 
version of it, political things accord with equal respect for relevant people only if they are 
equally justifiable to, or acceptable by, these people. This is the kind of equal respect in which 
Macedo and Larmore anchor public justification. Equal respect in this sense requires respecting 
others not merely as recipients, but as equal authorities or co-authors of political justice and 
justification (Forst 2017, p. 134). Thus, it involves according others a justificatory say, or 
discursive influence, in practices of reason giving in relation to what counts as just, justified, or 
reasonable to begin with. In different terms, equal respect in the conception-constraining sense 
involves according others constitutive discursive standing and hence takes the form of discursive 
respect (Besch 2014 and 2019).  
On the reading suggested here, political liberalism adopts an idea of actualist public 
justification that expresses, or models, a commitment to extend equal discursive respect to actual 
reasonable citizens. Macedo and Larmore are more forthcoming about this commitment than 
Rawls, but he, too, adopts it. True, his model of a well-ordered society construes equal respect as 
conception-dependent and public justification as ideal and, many assume, conception-applying. 
But this model is part of JF, and JF depends for its reasonableness on its equal acceptability by 
actual reasonable citizens. And, I submit, it is this deeper requirement–one that applies to JF as a 
whole–that expresses, or models, the commitment to equal discursive respect.  
 
                                                 
 
6 On this picture, also public reason giving is conception-dependent: reasonable people are to reason 
publicly if political justice, as specified by a reasonable conception of justice, requires it. Some authors who see 
public justification as IJ-justification think of matters in such terms: e.g., see Quong 2014, p. 273. This sits well with 
non-constructivist views of public justification: it suggests that the public justifiability of political things is required 
only if a reasonable conception of justice prescribes that they must be so justifiable–where the reasonableness of the 
latter hence cannot depend on its public justifiability: see Enoch 2015, Wall 2016.  
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3. Three levels of argument 
It is useful here to distinguish three levels of argument in Rawls‟s mature view of domestic 
justice. Thus, let me consider in broad terms the discursive structure of that view.  
This structure, I submit, is roughly as follows. Rawls addresses reasonable citizens of a 
Western liberal democracy, and submits to their consideration answers to questions such as: 
Q1 What must a conception of political justice be like to be able to provide a basis 
for political legitimacy within a Western liberal democracy?  
Q2 If such a conception must take the form of a political liberalism, what view of 
that kind should be adopted?  
To answer Q1, Rawls argues that φ can provide a basis for political legitimacy in a society of the 
relevant kind only if φ is equally acceptable by the reasonable citizens of that society, and that φ 
must hence be political in scope and form of justification and liberal in content–i.e., roughly, φ 
must only regulate that society‟s domain of the political and construe equal acceptability by its 
reasonable citizens as politically justifying, while only containing liberal political values. To 
make this case, Rawls argues that a conception of justice cannot be equally acceptable by 
reasonable citizens unless it can attain an overlapping consensus between their reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, while only a political and liberal conception can accomplish this. Call 
this Rawls‟s level-1-arguments. 
Rawls‟s answer to Q2 takes the form of JF–which itself has two stages, S1 and S2. S1 
includes JF‟s argument from the Original Position (or OP) to JF‟s principles of justice (Rawls 
2001, p. 14-18, 42-52). OP proposes a model of rational choice under reasonable constraints. 
Rawls claims that reasonable people, if they were to choose principles of basic justice, would do 
so as modelled by OP. And he argues that they would adopt JF‟s principles. Call this Rawls‟s 
level-2-arguments.  
S2 engages the theme of stability, amongst other things. Rawls defines an ideal of the 
good citizen–i.e., a reasonable and rational citizen who endorses JF–and argues that a society of 
such citizens that is well-ordered by JF would be stable (Rawls 2005, p. 11f, 16f, 22-28, 66-82, 
94, 97f; Rawls 2001, p. 8f, p. 26-29, 116f). This is because, in this society, JF would serve these 
citizens as a shared basis of public justification that they can draw on to secure stable agreement 
in matters of basic justice, while JF would order this society so as to encourage “cooperative 
virtues of political life” (Rawls 2001, p.116f)–e.g., reasonableness, fairness, or the disposition to 
comply with a duty of civility to exercise public reason in salient matters–that “underwrite” a 
willingness to cooperate with others “on a footing of equality and mutual respect.” (Ibid.) Rawls 
here employs an idea of public justification as ideal and, many assume, conception-applying. 
Call the arguments at JF‟s second stage Rawls‟s level-3-arguments.7 
                                                 
 
7 Some authors suggest that JF‟s stability-centric considerations are part of the argument from OP: Gaus 
and Schoelandt 2017, p. 149; Weithman 2017. On this view, it is from the perspective of the parties of OP that 
stability-centric considerations bear on the selection of principles of justice. I foreground a different perspective. For 
Rawls, JF is reasonable only if JF as a whole is acceptable from the perspective of actual reasonable citizens (see 
below). It is from this perspective that the role of the argument from OP and JF‟s stability-centric considerations vis-
à-vis each other and the task of principle selection must be acceptable. But it is possible that, from this perspective, 
reasons can arise to revise OP or its role on the basis of stability-centric considerations. Hence, it is best to see 
Rawls‟s level-3-arguments and his level-2-arguments as distinct stages of his overall view.   
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What matters here are Rawls‟s level-1-arguments. They are more fundamental in political 
liberalism‟s order of justification than his level-2-arguments or his level-3-arguments. This is so 
since Rawls‟s answer to Q2 supposes that Q1 can be answered in a way that supports the project 
of a political liberalism: the answer to Q1 sets a frame that a JF aims to fill out. And, we shall 
now see, Rawls‟s level-1-arguments put centre stage an idea of actualist public justification.  
 
4. Toward actualist and fundamental public justification 
With this I turn to the political role of Rawls‟s criterion of reflective equilibrium (CRE).8 To 
assist my reading, I make an assumption that is implicit in the above already. In the present 
context, views to the effect that political things depend for a salient political merit (e.g., 
reasonableness, or legitimacy), on being equally acceptable by reasonable people reflect a 
commitment to the public justifiability of these things, or of claims to the effect that they have 
that merit. With this in mind, consider CRE. 
 For Rawls, any conception of political justice, “to be acceptable, must accord with our 
considered convictions, at all levels of generality, on due reflection, or in what I have called 
elsewhere “reflective equilibrium”.” (Rawls 2005, p. 8) φ is in reflective equilibrium with a set 
of views, S, only if φ coheres with S, each member of S is well-considered, and S is internally 
coherent (ibid).9 Thus, any conception of political justice, including JF, must cohere with the 
considered judgments of relevant people.  
 Much depends on the standpoint from which reflective equilibrium is to be sought. Rawls 
highlights three standpoints, including “that of the parties in the original position, that of citizens 
in a well-ordered society, and finally, that of ourselves–of you and me who are elaborating 
justice as fairness and examining it as a political conception of justice” (ibid, p. 28). For CRE‟s 
purposes, the third standpoint is essential. As Rawls highlights, the other two standpoints are not 
actually adopted by anyone, but belong to JF‟s conceptual inventory–where JF is but one theory 
of justice that must be assessed from the standpoint of “you and me.” Thus, the test of reflective 
equilibrium tests how well a conception of justice 
as a whole articulates our more firm considered convictions of political justice, at all 
levels of generality, after due examination, once all adjustments and revisions that 
seem compelling have been made. A conception of justice that meets this criterion is 
the conception of justice that, so far as we can now ascertain, is the most reasonable 
for us. (Ibid; all emphases are added.) 
Accordingly, JF aims to articulate “our more firm considered convictions,” while “[w]e decide 
whether the whole conception is acceptable by seeing whether we can endorse it upon due 
reflection” (Ibid, p. 94; all emphases added).  
                                                 
 
8 The below adds to my discussion in [omitted for blind review]. That CRE has a political role has been 
observed before: see Lister 2008; Nielsen 1994; Besch 1998.  
9 On reflective equilibrium: see Rawls 2005, p. 28, 45; Rawls 2001, p. 30ff; Rawls 1971, p. 20f, 48-51; see 
also Daniels 1979 and 1980; Raz 1982; Scanlon 2002; Knight 2006; Kelly and McGrath 2010; Laden 2014; Baderin 
2017.  
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 Who is referred to here as “you and me”?10 Evidently, actual people.11 But not just 
anyone: some constrains are imposed on the standpoint from which reflective equilibrium is to 
be sought. Why? We may take it that Rawls presents JF as a political liberalism in part because 
he believes that JF, if it takes this form, can meet CRE. But CRE from the outset disqualifies JF 
if the group of people for whom JF must meet CRE included on equal footing people who cannot 
coherently accept political liberalism‟s most important liberal political values. Thus: the 
reflective equilibria of actual citizens count, but only those citizens count who can coherently 
accept these values, namely, citizens who are reasonable in political liberalism‟s sense.  
 But if the reflective equilibria of actual reasonable citizens count, they count equally. 
This much springs from political liberalism‟s commitment to extend equal discursive respect to 
reasonable citizens. Thus: conceptions of political justice must attain interpersonal reflective 
equilibrium–or general reflective equilibrium, as Rawls calls this (Rawls 2005, p. 388, and 2001, 
p. 31). Thus, CRE specifies in what way φ must be acceptable for each reasonable person for this 
to count toward φ‟s equal acceptability by–or, with the above assumption, φ‟s public 
justifiability to–all reasonable people. Textual evidence confirms this: Rawls writes that JF, 
when it attains public justification, is affirmed in reflective equilibrium (Rawls 2001, p. 29, and 
2005, p. 388).  
 This suggests we attribute to Rawls Actualist Public Justification (for conceptions of 
political justice, φ): 
APJ φ is reasonable if and only if φ is equally acceptable coherently by, or publicly 
justifiable to, actual reasonable citizens, 
where φ is “equally acceptable coherently” by α and β only if each can accept φ coherently in 
CRE‟s sense, and citizens are “reasonable” only if they do not reject political liberalism‟s most 
important liberal political values. Some comments are called for. 
 
5. Some comments 
First, Rawls distinguishes narrow and wide reflective equilibrium–which differ primarily in 
relation to the scope and depth of the reflection through which equilibrium is reached. Rawls 
prefers wide over narrow equilibrium (Rawls 1974, p. 8f; Rawls 2001, p. 29-32, and 2005, p. 
387f). As wide equilibrium can be less conservative than narrow equilibrium, it is worth noting 
that Rawls‟s preference for wide equilibrium can cohere with his view that only a political 
liberalism, if anything, is equally acceptable by reasonable citizens. As we have seen, citizens 
here count as reasonable only if they can coherently accept political liberalism‟s most important 
liberal political values. And one way to square this with the dynamics of wide reflective 
equilibrium is to distinguish, on the lines of what we saw earlier, between the perspective from 
which an agent pursues reflective equilibrium and, say, her actual deliberative field, or the set of 
views, widely conceived, that she actually accesses, considers or tries to balance in the process. I 
take it that reflective equilibrium can be wide even if it is perspectival or not standpoint-neutral–
i.e., even if some views or commitments remained fixed points throughout an agent‟s effort to 
                                                 
 
10 For Onora O‟Neill, this marks important differences between Rawls‟s view of public reason and her 
Kantian view: O‟Neill 2015 and 1996, chapter 2.   
11 This is worth noting: Rawls also discusses CRE in relation to the hypothetical citizens of JF‟s well-
ordered society: Rawls 2001, p. 9f. 
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attain wide equilibrium in her deliberative field. Thus, political liberalism‟s most important 
liberal political values, or a commitment not to reject them, here mark the perspective from 
which reasonable citizens pursue wide reflective equilibrium, rather than being mere items in 
their deliberative field.12 
 Second, APJ-justification is robustly public (Postema 1995). Rawls does not claim 
merely that a reasonable conception of political justice will also be acceptable by reasonable 
people. He makes the stronger, constructivist claim that the reasonableness of such a conception 
depends on, or is (partly) constituted by, its acceptability by reasonable citizens. In the terms 
used earlier, APJ accords reasonable people a justificatory say on what conception of political 
justice qualifies as reasonable, or extends them discursive respect in such matters. Thus, if actual 
reasonable citizens cannot actually accept φ coherently, APJ counts this as (defeasible) evidence 
in own right that φ is not reasonable; and if they cannot actually reject φ coherently, APJ counts 
this as (defeasible) evidence in its own right that φ is reasonable.  
 Third, APJ is fundamental in political liberalism‟s order of justification. Conceptions of 
political justice provide a basis for conditionally reasoned justifications, but these justifications 
can have only a provisional, pro tanto authority (Rawls 2005, p. 386). After all, they depend for 
their authority on the reasonableness of the conceptions they draw on. Accordingly, APJ relates 
to such conceptions and conception-dependent justifications like standards of theory-acceptance 
relate to the theories they apply to: the latter depend for their authority on meeting the former.  
 Fourth, I may leave open here whether APJ can be applied to political principles, value 
judgements, or other political things, directly in a manner that would leave no meaningful 
justificatory role for conceptions of political justice. If it can be so applied, Rawls‟s political 
liberalism is structurally closer to the views of first-generation political liberals like Macedo and 
Larmore than it would otherwise seem. I also leave open whether reasonableness in APJ‟s sense 
is a family trait of conceptions of justice. If it is–which is an option Rawls seems to favor–then 
APJ by itself underdetermines the public choice of a token conception of political justice.  
 Fifth, APJ helps to explain why “political liberalism applies the principle of toleration to 
philosophy itself” (ibid, p. 10). For Rawls, to apply this principle to philosophy is or involves 
requiring conceptions of political justice to avoid reasonable disagreements between reasonable 
citizens–or to be neutral in a justificatory sense. However, Rawls takes it that if φ is reasonably 
rejected by some reasonable citizens and reasonably accepted by others, then φ is the subject of 
reasonable disagreement.13 But if φ is the subject of such disagreement, then there is evidence 
that φ is not equally acceptable by reasonable citizens. Thus: if conceptions of political justice 
must meet APJ, then there is reason for them to avoid reasonable disagreement. 
 Sixth, a disclaimer: it is beyond what I can do here to show how APJ sits with many of 
Rawls‟s key claims, including especially his claim that only a political liberalism can provide a 
basis for political legitimacy (but I address this in [omitted for blind review] and [omitted for 
blind review]). For now, I only relate APJ to JF‟s Original Position, reasonable overlapping 
consensus (see below), and Rawls‟s idea of political legitimacy (section 8). Yet, plainly, APJ 
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See also Larmore 2015, p. 68-74. 
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leans toward political liberalism: the search for a conception of political justice from the ground 
up privileges the perspective of reasonable people–i.e., people who do not reject political 
liberalism‟s most important liberal political values.  
 
6. The Original Position and overlapping consensus  
JF‟s Original Position (OP) and the aim of reasonable overlapping consensus are often taken to 
play important justificatory roles in Rawls‟s view. It is hence instructive to relate them to APJ. I 
start with OP. 
 OP is often regarded as expressing an idea of practical reason such that if any actual 
citizen cannot coherently accept OP‟s results, such as JF‟s principles, then this must be owed to 
that person‟s unreasonableness or irrationality.14 But this cannot be right. If conceptions of 
political justice depend for their reasonableness on their equal acceptability by reasonable 
citizens, the reasonableness of these citizens cannot depend on their acceptance of OP‟s results. 
In this light, consider:  
[OP] models what we regard–you and I, here and now–as fair and reasonable conditions 
for the parties, who are rational representatives of free and equal, reasonable and rational 
citizens (…). [OP] also models what we regard as appropriate restrictions on reasons for 
adopting a political conception of justice for [the basic structure of society] … [W]e 
conjecture that the conception of political justice the parties would select is the 
conception that you and I, here and now, would regard as reasonable and rational and 
supported by the best reasons. Whether the conjecture is borne out will depend on 
whether you and I, here and now, can, on due reflection, endorse the principles adopted. 
(Rawls 2001, p. 30.) 
OP models what “you and I” see as reasonable and rational deliberation, or as proper constraints 
on reasons to adopt a conception of political justice. Rawls stresses that OP‟s success as such a 
model turns on whether OP‟s results match what “you and I” on reflection regard as reasonable 
and rational, or as supported by the best reasons. Accordingly, he writes that OP is “a means of 
public reflection and self-clarification” that aims to help “us” attain “deeper self-understanding” 
and “greater coherence among all our judgements,” with the help of which “we can attain wider 
agreement among one another” (Rawls 2005, p. 26). And one assumption here is that “we” can 
tell from the standpoint of “our” considered judgments whether OP advances that end.  
 What people does Rawls refer to? These, I submit, are the people from the perspective of 
whom JF must be acceptable for it to be reasonable, namely, actual reasonable citizens. One way 
to interpret OP‟s role hence is this. OP is a reconstructive tool to draw out or clarify implications 
of the self-understanding of actual reasonable citizens. OP‟s success as such a tool depends on 
whether OP‟s results cohere with the considered judgments of these citizens–which is something 
they assess from the standpoint of their considered judgments. If they conclude that OP fits their 
self-understanding, OP succeeds in its role–in which case OP advances JF‟s public justification. 
But if OP does not succeed in its role, it does not advance JF‟s public justification–in which case 
                                                 
 
14 Some Kantian readings of Rawls make this assumption: see Doppelt 1988 and 1989. 
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these citizens must decide from their perspective whether to revise or reject JF. Either way, their 
considered judgments have the last word.15 
 On this reading, then, it is not the case that if actual citizens cannot coherently accept 
OP‟s results, this must speak to their unreasonableness or irrationality. In relation to actual 
reasonable citizens, the dependency is reversed: if they cannot on reflection coherently accept 
OP‟s results, this calls into question the reasonableness of OP‟s results (or JF) if this conclusion 
is favored by their considered judgments.  
 Next, consider reasonable overlapping consensus. Rawls writes: 
Public justification happens when all the reasonable members of political society carry 
out a justification of the shared political conception by embedding it in their several 
reasonable comprehensive views. In this case, reasonable citizens take one another into 
account as having reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endorse that political 
conception ... Only when there is a reasonable overlapping consensus can political 
society's political conception of justice be publicly–though never finally–justified. 
Granting that we should give weight to the considered convictions of other reasonable 
citizens, this is because general and wide reflective equilibrium with respect to a public 
justification gives the best justification of the political conception that we can have at any 
given time. There is … no public justification for political society without a reasonable 
overlapping consensus… (Rawls 2005, p. 387f.) 
This, I submit, states a view of public justification under conditions of “reasonable pluralism” 
(see below) that applies to ideal and actualist public justification. Rawls draws on the link 
between public justification and reflective equilibrium and suggests that, under these conditions, 
a conception of justice, φ, can be publicly justifiable to actual reasonable citizens only if φ can 
attain an overlapping consensus between the reasonable comprehensive doctrines that these 
citizens endorse. Specifically, the idea seems to be:  
(i) φ is APJ-justifiable only if φ is acceptable by each actual reasonable citizen in 
reflective equilibrium.  
(ii) In conditions of reasonable pluralism, reasonable citizens accept reasonable but 
incompatible comprehensive doctrines.  
(iii) Hence: φ is suitably acceptable only if φ coheres with, or can “in some way” 
(ibid, p. 386) be embedded in, the reasonable comprehensive doctrines of 
reasonable citizens. 
However, if φ can be embedded in these doctrines, φ attains a reasonable overlapping consensus. 
Thus: actualist and fundamental public justification does not compete with the aim of reasonable 
overlapping consensus, but requires that this aim can be attained.16 
 Observe that this coheres with the notion of reasonable pluralism, or one of the two 
notions that Rawls uses. On one notion, a plurality of comprehensive doctrines instantiates 
                                                 
 
15 This is on the trajectory of Scanlon‟s reading of the relationship between CRE and OP: see Scanlon 
2002, p. 153-157.  
16 A related matter is the potential redundancy of the aim of reasonable overlapping consensus: see 
[omitted for blind review].   
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reasonable pluralism only if each doctrine is perfectly reasonable (ibid, p. 24 n. 27). Call this 
ideal reasonable pluralism: it obtains in JF‟s well-ordered society. Another notion surfaces here: 
[The fact of reasonable pluralism] is the fact that free institutions tend to generate not 
simply a variety of doctrines and views … Rather, it is the fact that among the views that 
develop are a diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. These are the doctrines 
that reasonable citizens affirm and that political liberalism must address. (Ibid, p. 36; all 
emphases are added.) 
This entails that reasonable pluralism can obtain even if many unreasonable doctrines are 
present. Call this non-ideal reasonable pluralism: it can obtain in actual societies. When it 
obtains, political liberalism addresses only a subset of doctrines, namely, the subset that only 
includes reasonable doctrines of reasonable citizens. In short, given APJ, political liberalism 
aims at a reasonable overlapping consensus also in the real world–although in the real world, 
such a consensus might not be very inclusive in scope. 
 
7. Quong’s reading 
To conclude the reconstructive part of this discussion, I contrast the above reading with Quong‟s 
reading of public justification in Rawls‟s political liberalism. Since both readings take it that 
political liberalism requires conceptions of political justice to be publicly justifiable to 
reasonable citizens, it is instructive to see where they differ.  
 On Quong‟s reading, Rawls‟s political liberalism aims to show “how liberal rights and 
institutions can be publicly justified to the constituency of an ideal democratic society” (Quong 
2011, p. 6; my emphasis). Accordingly,  
the overlapping consensus represents the first stage in the justificatory process. We begin 
by identifying the common ground that reasonable citizens would share in an ideal, well-
ordered liberal society … [T]he core ideas of freedom, equality, fairness, and reasonable 
pluralism are assumed to ground a commitment to public reason and a liberal conception 
of justice, but the core ideas are not themselves subject to any test of public justification, 
nor do we check to see if these values can be the subject of an overlapping consensus 
amongst real citizens here and now. (Quong 2012, p. 51f; all emphases are mine.) 
This suggests: political liberalism requires conceptions of political justice to be publicly 
justifiable not to “real citizens here and now,” but only to “the constituency of an ideal 
democratic society,” namely, the (non-existent) reasonable citizens of a (non-existent) well-
ordered society. Accordingly, it seeks an overlapping consensus only between the reasonable 
doctrines of these (non-existent) reasonable citizens–where citizens and their doctrines are 
reasonable only if they do not reject political liberalism‟s most important liberal political values. 
Thus, public justification here is a form of ideal justification. 
 Quong aims to improve on what he calls the “common view” of the role of overlapping 
consensus in Rawls (Quong 2011, p. 163ff). According to the common view, two things hold. 
First, only JF‟s principles of justice, rather than JF as a whole, must attain a reasonable 
overlapping consensus. And second, OP addresses “an independently defined constituency of 
persons” (ibid, p. 166), rather than only reasonable citizens, i.e., citizens who are reasonable in 
political liberalism‟s sense. Quong disagrees with the common view on both counts. 
 Quong is right to disagree with this view on these counts. Since his political turn, Rawls 
elevates the role of public justification and hence of overlapping consensus: JF as a whole must 
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be publicly justifiable to reasonable citizens–where the reasonable do not reject political 
liberalism‟s most important liberal political values (the above quotation samples Quong‟s view 
of what these are). This changes the architecture of Rawls‟s overall view: public justification is 
now part of a first, fundamental stage of argument in political liberalism.  
 But how should we interpret this change? This is where the reading suggested here and 
Quong‟s reading part ways. Quong seems to infer from the fact that political liberalism construes 
public justification as part of a first, fundamental stage of justification, and the fact that it aims to 
publicly justify salient things only to citizens who are reasonable in political liberalism‟s sense, 
that public justification is always ideal justification (Quong 2011, p. 6f, 138f, 166ff, 180ff). But 
consider where this leaves political liberalism. According to Quong, public justification would 
not enfranchise actual citizens–i.e., it would not check whether salient values are acceptable by 
“real citizens here and now” (see above)–although this  
should not be misunderstood to mean that political liberalism is not also addressed to real 
citizens … Each of us ought to recognize [political liberalism‟s political values] as very 
great values, ones which should regulate the way in which we treat our fellow citizens. 
The normative conclusions of political liberalism thus provide us with powerful reasons 
to behave in certain ways, and not others, in our current world. (Quong 2011, p. 159.)  
However, public liberalism would address actual citizens only in the weak sense of treating them 
as recipients of public justification. Political liberalism would expect their compliance with its 
conclusions. But it would not make these conclusions depend for their reasonableness or 
justification on their equal acceptability by any actual citizen here and now. No actual citizen 
here and now would have a justificatory say in relation to the content of political justice or its 
justification.17  
 But this cannot capture the nature of political liberalism‟s commitment to equal respect, 
or so I claim. Political liberalism respects actual reasonable citizens not merely as recipients, but 
as authorities or co-authors of public justification: it accords them a justificatory say, or 
discursive respect. Yes, it expects actual citizens to abide by the normative conclusions of 
political liberalism. But it does this insofar as these conclusions can be supported by a reasonable 
conception of political justice, where the reasonableness of such conceptions depends on their 
acceptability by actual reasonable citizens. Thus: public justification is part of a fundamental 
stage of justification and aims to publicly justify salient political things only to citizens that it 
regards as reasonable. But this reflects a commitment to actualist justification: Rawls‟s political 
liberalism is fundamentally a form of actualist, rather than ideal, political liberalism. 
 
8. Political legitimacy and the exclusion objection 
With this I turn to the exclusion objection. Political liberalism construes the legitimacy of 
exercises of political power as a function of their justifiability to citizens who do not reject 
political liberalism‟s most important liberal political values. It has often been argued that this 
renders the view objectionably exclusionary.18 What I will do in the remainder of this discussion 
                                                 
 
17 That Quong-type public justification can address actual citizens in one sense is sometimes overlooked: 
e.g., see Schoelandt 2015, p. 1039.  
18 This objection has been made since the early days of Rawls‟s political turn: e.g., see Hampton 1989 and 
1993; Campos 1994; Besch (1998); Friedman (2000). 
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is to consider whether Larmore‟s hypotheticalizing variant of actualist public justification can 
accommodate this objection. This will bring to the fore deeper questions about the nature of 
discursive (in)equality in actualist public justification.  
 How does APJ relate to Rawls‟s liberal principle of legitimacy (LPL)? According to LPL, 
political power must be exercised “in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all 
citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
them as reasonable and rational” (Rawls 2005, p. 217). This refers to principles and ideals that 
are justifiable as reasonable and rational by a reasonable conception of political justice. But to be 
reasonable, such conceptions must be equally acceptable by actual reasonable citizens–where, as 
suggested above p.5, this expresses, or models, an idea of equal discursive respect. Thus, Rawls 
adopts a respect-based actualist form of justificatory liberalism: to properly respect actual 
reasonable citizens, exercises of political power must be justifiable on grounds that are equally 
acceptable by them.19  
Central here is the idea that citizens are owed a measure of discursive influence at a 
fundamental level of political justification–or a share of “discursive power” (Forst 2017, p. 10f), 
or discursive standing of relevant discursive purchase (see below). This places weight on the 
participation value of public justification ([omitted for blind review]). That is, the point is not 
simply that political power must be based on grounds that relevant people can accept (say, at 
some level of idealization); the point is, rather, that their actual ability or inability to accept a 
conception of justice is to have traction on its eligibility for the role. This is part of the non-
domination or emancipatory upshot of Rawls‟s view of political legitimacy.20 Of course, a flip-
side here is that only reasonable citizens get to have such influence. Unreasonable citizens are 
not, or not in the same way, respected as co-authors of public justification.  
 Does this cohere with political liberalism‟s “public reason intuitions,” as Enoch calls 
them (Enoch 2015, p. 114ff)? The phrase refers to the two-fold view that political power can be 
reconciled with the freedom and equality of citizens only if it is justifiable to them, and equally 
so. For Rawls, this reconciliation requires such power to be justifiable on grounds that are 
equally acceptable by reasonable citizens. Note that it is not clear whose freedom and equality 
political liberalism aims to reconcile with political power. Some critics, notably Enoch, assume 
that Rawls‟s political liberalism initially aims to reconcile the freedom and equality of all 
citizens with political power, or at least not only reasonable people (ibid, p. 122-126). This 
makes political liberalism an easy target for an internal version of the exclusion objection. For if 
political liberalism pursues inclusive aims, it does not achieve them: the equal justifiability of 
political power to citizens who are reasonable in political liberalism‟s sense might reconcile their 
freedom and equality with political power, but it does little to reconcile the freedom and equality 
of other citizens with political power (ibid).  
 But there is another, perhaps more charitable reading that clarifies the terms of the 
problem that political liberalism aims to solve in light of the solution it offers. Macedo tells us 
                                                 
 
19 I discuss political legitimacy in Rawls in more detail in [omitted for blind review]. 
20 But we should not overstate the import of the influence that APJ accords the reasonable: there may not 
be emancipatory trickle-down effects such that an agent‟s discursive influence at the level of assessments of the 
reasonableness of conceptions of justice translates into influence in lower-order assessments of the legitimacy of 
exercises of political power–and it will often only be the latter kind of influence that demonstrates in the eyes of 
agents that their perspectives matter politically.  
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how: political liberalism, he notes, respects as “free and equal (…) all those who pass certain 
threshold tests of reasonableness: we respect those whose disagreement with us does not impugn 
their reasonableness” (Macedo 1991, p. 47, 71). Thus, what political liberalism aims to reconcile 
with political power is the freedom and equality not of all citizens, but of all citizens that it 
respects as free and equal, namely, reasonable citizens. As far as the public reason intuitions are 
concerned, therefore, the exclusion objection misfires as a stretch of internal criticism: in 
political liberalism, the equal justifiability of exercises of political power to reasonable citizens is 
all that is called for to begin with.  
Still, the exclusion objection has much appeal. If the legitimacy of political power is a 
function of its justifiability, and if justification must model equal discursive respect, then such 
power must be equally justifiable to everyone to whom such respect is owed. But why should it 
be owed only to citizens who do not reject political liberalism‟s most important political values? 
Why is it a non-rejection of these things on which an entitlement to exercise (a full measure of) 
discursive influence at a fundamental level of political justification hinges? Again, I set aside 
what values are built into APJ‟s idea of the reasonable. Yet, arguably, many citizens might not 
qualify as reasonable in political liberalism‟s sense. Thus, the exclusion objection articulates the 
concern that it is in one form or another impermissible–or unjust, arbitrary, dogmatic, and so on–
to extend equal discursive respect only to citizens who are reasonable in that sense. 
It remains open how Rawls-type political liberalism can plausibly respond to the 
exclusion objection without at the same time undermining itself. Consider just two of the more 
self-suggesting responses. First, public justification might fully enfranchise (some) people who 
are not reasonable in political liberalism‟s sense–people, that is who cannot accept (all of) its 
most important liberal political values. But it must then be doubtful that a political and liberal 
conception of justice can be claimed to be reasonable in APJ‟s then-inclusive sense. Second, 
political liberalism might justify the values it builds into APJ‟s idea of the reasonable to 
unreasonable people. But then APJ-justification cannot be fundamental; and so one question will 
be how this could square with the commitment to accord reasonable citizens discursive respect at 
a fundamental level of political justification. Either way, political liberalism seems pushed to 
sacrifice something essential to the project. 
 
9. Hypotheticalizing actualist public justification? 
Maybe actualist public justification can be more inclusive and prioritize reasonableness if it 
includes unreasonable citizens in its constituency, but recognizes discursive input as counting 
toward public justification only insofar as it is reasonable. Can hypotheticalization help?  
 In passing, I note two things. First, hypotheticalization here is not ad hoc, as Enoch objects 
(Enoch 2015, p. 118-120, 126-130). After all, political liberalism is from the outset committed to 
prioritize the reasonable. Second, hypotheticalization does not turn actualist public justification 
into Quong-type ideal public justification. Yes, hypotheticalized actualist public justification 
“idealizes” (in one sense) around its fringes, but it fully enfranchises actual reasonable citizens. 
 Larmore expressly hypotheticalizes actualist public justification, or what he calls “rational 
dialogue” (Larmore 2015, p. 74-87, and 1996, p. 134ff). He concedes that political liberalism 
excludes some people in some way, such as unreasonable citizens or people who do not “prize 
most highly the norms of rational dialogue and equal respect” (Larmore 1996, p. 142, and 2015, 
p. 83). Still, he insists, exercises of political power must be justifiable to citizens more generally 
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on the (perhaps counterfactual) assumption that they are reasonable.21 Thus, in relation to the 
unreasonable, what counts toward public justification is what they would accept if they were 
reasonable. This coheres with the idea of equal respect:  
[T]he moral idea of respect for persons lying at the heart of political liberalism should be 
formulated more precisely as follows: the fundamental principles of political society, 
being coercive in nature, ought to be such that all who are to be subject to them must be 
able from their perspective to see reason to endorse them on the [perhaps counterfactual] 
assumption that they are committed to basing political association on principles that can 
meet the reasonable agreement of citizens. (Larmore 2015, p. 82f.) 
The point: Larmore-type hypotheticalized actualist public justification (or LAJ) does not restrict 
its constituency to the reasonable, but adds a reasonableness constraint on the kind of discursive 
input that is counts as authoritative. Thus, LAJ accords a justificatory say not only to reasonable 
people, but counts exercises of this say as authoritative only insofar as they are reasonable.22  
 Can LAJ accommodate the exclusion objection? One way to pick up the stick is to ask 
whether LAJ can model equal discursive respect. Upfront, this is doubtful: LAJ, too, prioritizes 
the reasonable. Yet on reflection, a more nuanced assessment is needed, or so we shall find.  
 To start with, recall that all acceptability-based justification must qualify the discursive 
input it counts as authoritative, and so will hypotheticalize. E.g., to justify, acceptability must be 
respectable, thoughtful, coherent, or some such. This means that discursive equality must be seen 
in light of relevant authoritativeness constraints–or, in the present case, a reasonableness 
threshold. With this in mind, consider now discursive equality.23  
 Actualist public justification expresses, or models, an idea of equal discursive respect in 
that it accords people an equal justificatory say, or equal constitutive discursive standing. Now, 
one especially salient respect in which discursive standing can be equal or unequal is its 
discursive purchase. What is this? Roughly, discursive purchase is a function of the discursive 
influence that an agent‟s discursive standing accords her in justification, or on its outcomes, 
given her actual deliberative resources (widely conceived so as to include the entire range of 
views, volitions, commitments, capacities, and so on, that she draws on in her practical thought). 
When we consider discursive purchase, we consider the participation value of justification: we 
consider how standards of justification relate to the agents they apply to, or range over, and what 
level of discursive influence in justification these standards allocate these agents ([omitted for 
blind review]).  
                                                 
 
21 Larmore 2015, p. 83. He reads Rawls‟s view of political legitimacy in such terms: ibid, p. 75f, and 1999, 
p. 609f.  
22 This simplifies. Hypotheticalization must add constraints that suffice for authoritativeness. Yet Larmore 
construes reasonableness in thin epistemic terms that make it only necessary for authoritativeness. Thus, discursive 
input must arguably also cohere with other things, such as the commitment to “prize most highly the norms of 
rational dialogue and equal respect” (Larmore 1996, p. 142). For now, I put things in terms of reasonableness and 
take the latter to suffice for authoritativeness. On reasonableness in Larmore: see Macedo 1991, p. 260f, and 
[omitted for blind review]. 
23 The following applies to the present case the account of discursive equality proposed in [omitted for 
blind review], [omitted for blind review]. 
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 This influence comes in degrees. Consider two justification practices, JP1 and JP2, that 
accord average Betty a justificatory say, but apply to her different authoritativeness constraints. 
JP1 counts her rejection of φ as authoritative if it is locally coherent in light of her actual 
deliberative resources. JP2 counts her rejection of φ as authoritative only if she would still reject 
φ if she was fully or ideally rational. It is plain that JP1 can give Betty‟s actual perspective 
traction in justification in a way in which JP2 does not. As JP1 sets its bar for authoritativeness at 
a readily accessible level, her justificatory say can be meaningful: if she cannot actually accept φ 
coherently, this in its own right can count as (defeasible) evidence that φ is not justified. Hence, 
her discursive standing is high in purchase. Not so in JP2, for better or worse. If her actual say is 
not aligned with an ideally rational say, Betty‟s coherent rejections do not count as evidence that 
φ is not justified. Thus, her standing is low in purchase, or lower than in JP1.  
 Discursive standing can vary in purchase also in a single justification practice. One factor 
that determines purchase is how readily available it is for people to meet salient authoritativeness 
constraints. Other things being equal, the more readily available this is for an agent, the more 
will her standing resemble Betty‟s standing in JP1. And the less available this is, the more will it 
resemble Betty‟s standing in JP2. At the limit, discursive practice can put it out of the actual 
reach of people to exercise any relevant level of discursive influence: thus, while people might 
notionally have a justificatory say, their standing might have little discursive purchase. 
 A final matter worth highlighting now concerns justification practices that adopt non-trivial 
authoritativeness constraints–constraints, that is, that not every relevant agent readily meets 
anyway. Where agents relevantly differ in their deliberative resources, such constraints often are 
not equally available to them. As a result, their discursive standing will differ in purchase. E.g., if 
authoritative input must at least be thoughtful and coherent, always-thoughtful-and-coherent 
Betty‟s voice always qualifies as authoritative (thus, her standing is like Betty‟s in JP1), while 
rarely-thoughtful-and-coherent Paul‟s voice rarely does (and so his standing is like Betty‟s in 
JP2). Now, actualist public justification includes in its constituency real people and instantiates 
in contexts of actual interpersonal difference. Hence, it is expectable, if not unavoidable, that a 
practice of actualist public justification, when it applies the same non-trivial authoritativeness 
constraint across a diverse constituency, allocates discursive standing that differs in purchase.  
 This suggests we distinguish between two ways in which discursive standing can be equal. 
A justification practice, JP, accords α and β discursive standing that is equal formally if and only 
if it accords α and β discursive standing of the same kind (e.g., constitutive discursive standing) 
and applies to α and β the same authoritativeness constraints (e.g., a reasonableness threshold). 
But JP accords α and β discursive standing that is equal substantively only if it accords them 
standing that is equal in discursive purchase. The intuitive point: while formal discursive equality 
is a matter of the consistent application of salient standards to relevant agents, substantive 
discursive equality is a matter of the measure of discursive influence in justification, or on its 
outcomes, that an application of these standards leaves relevant agents with.24 
 
10. Equal discursive respect? 
                                                 
 
24 The idea of substantive discursive equality is sympathetic with Susan Dieleman‟s idea of substantive 
inclusion (Dieleman 2015, p. 803). Substantive discursive inequality (i.e., purchase inequality), when impermissible, 
can instantiate an objectionable failure to include substantively in her sense. See also [omitted for blind review].     
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LAJ can meet formal discursive equality: it accords reasonable and unreasonable citizens 
constitutive discursive standing and applies to all the same reasonableness threshold. But LAJ 
does not meet substantive discursive equality: it allocates discursive standing that is unequal in 
discursive purchase. To the reasonable, it allocates high-purchase standing like Betty‟s standing 
in JP1. To other people, it allocates low-purchase standing more like Betty‟s standing in JP2.  
 If so, does LAJ model equal discursive respect? Yes and no. Yes, insofar as LAJ allocates 
citizens discursive standing that is equal formally. But no, insofar as LAJ does not allocate 
citizens standing that is equal substantively. This shifts the issue: what kind of discursive 
equality does equal discursive respect require? Let me assume here that equal discursive respect 
requires at least formally equal discursive standing: for LAJ to extend to α and β equal discursive 
respect, LAJ must at least allocate each constitutive discursive standing and apply to them the 
same reasonableness threshold. Does this suffice?  
 Intuitively, it does not. Discursive standing that is equal formally can be objectionably 
unequal in purchase. Consider JP3: it accords all citizens constitutive discursive standing and 
applies to all the same authoritativeness constraint, ψ. Let JP3‟s constituency include Dominant 
Group and Marginal Group, and assume that Dominant Group has used its influence to define ψ 
in terms of values that its members accept and other people reject: in JP3, discursive input counts 
as authoritative only insofar as it coheres with Dominant Group Values. Thus, while members of 
Dominant Group have a standing like Betty in JP1, others have a standing like Betty in JP2. JP3 
satisfies formal discursive equality. But it does not treat people as discursive equals or accord 
them (some purchase-sensitive form of) “equal opportunity for political influence” (Cohen 2006, 
p. 242) or equal “opportunities to participate in the process of public deliberation” (Peter 2009, p. 
67). Rather, JP3 entrenches the dominance of Dominant Group: it turns justification practice 
itself into a vehicle of domination, marginalization, or worse. And it is not a big stretch to see 
similarities between the standing of members of Marginal Group in JP3 and the standing of the 
unreasonable in LAJ. 
 Perhaps, then, LAJ can model equal discursive respect only if it allocates standing that is 
equal formally and substantively–i.e., if it satisfies discursive equity ([omitted for blind 
review])? LAJ cannot do this. But neither will any real-life practice of public justification that 
applies non-trivial authoritativeness constraints across real-life, diverse constituencies that 
include agents who relevantly differ in their deliberative resources–relevantly, that is, so as to 
affect how available it is for them to meet these constraints. If real-life public justification can 
model equal discursive respect, then, equal discursive respect cannot require discursive equity.  
 A third view is this: equal discursive respect allows for differences in discursive purchase, 
but not every form of purchase inequality is compatible with it. On this view, LAJ can extend α 
and β equal discursive respect even if LAJ accords α and β discursive standing that is unequal 
substantively if their standing does not impermissibly differ in discursive purchase. As far as this 
goes, this, I assume, is plausible. But it implies that we cannot know whether LAJ models equal 
discursive respect unless we know whether LAJ allocates permissible purchase inequality. Thus, 
the question shifts again: when is purchase inequality permissible, or just?25   
 Let me bring this back to the exclusion objection. I asked whether hypotheticalizing 
actualist public justification can accommodate this objection. To explore the matter, I considered 
                                                 
 
25 On conceptions of permissible purchase inequality: see [omitted for blind review]. 
19 
whether LAJ can model equal discursive respect. The above suggests a nuanced answer. LAJ can 
accord discursive standing that is equal formally. In one respect, then, LAJ can model discursive 
equality. But we have also seen that this does not suffice to accommodate the exclusion objection 
if equal discursive respect requires not only formal discursive equality, but also the absence of 
impermissible purchase inequality. Thus: even if hypotheticalized actualist public justification 
accords formally equal discursive standing to unreasonable citizens, it cannot model equal 
discursive respect, or accommodate the exclusion objection, unless its allocation of purchase 
inequality is permissible.  
 Now, we saw that some level of purchase inequality is permissible if actualist public 
justification across a diverse constituency can model equal discursive respect. But it is open 
whether LAJ‟s allocation of purchase inequality is permissible. And while this seems doubtful 
from the perspective of the exclusion objection, political liberals like Larmore are evidently 
committed to the view that LAJ‟s level of purchase inequality is permissible. Thus, proponents 
and critics of actualist political liberalism are left with two questions: 
(i) Who should be accorded a justificatory say in political liberalism‟s practices of 
actualist public justification (or: to whom should such justification extend equal 
discursive respect)?  
(ii) What level of substantive discursive inequality is permissible within such 
practices, or is compatible with equal discursive respect (or: when are purchase 
inequalities in such practices permissible, or just)? 
Hypotheticalizing actualist public justification can answer (i) in a manner that goes some way 
toward meeting the exclusion objection. But this puts (ii) center stage. While LAJ includes the 
unreasonable, it does so by allocating discursive standing that involves high levels of purchase 
inequality. And with this the issue now turns on an answer to (ii). Thus, how should we answer 
(ii)? What view of the permissibility of purchase inequality–or of purchase justice, for short 
([omitted for blind review])–should be adopted here? On this, the jury is still out.   
 
10. Conclusion 
This paper suggested that Rawls-type political liberalism puts center stage a conception of public 
justification that is actualist and fundamental. I sketched aspects of this conception and 
considered in this light the exclusion objection to political liberalism. We saw that also a 
Larmore-type hypotheticalized version of actualist and fundamental public justification cannot 
overcome this objection: insofar as it remains open whether LAJ allocates a permissible form of 
purchase inequality, it remains open whether LAJ expresses, or models, equal discursive respect. 
Yet rather than proving compelling grounds to reject political liberalism, this consideration leads 
to deeper questions about the nature of discursive equality in public justification.   
In closing, I make a general observation. The above left open how political liberalism 
defines APJ‟s idea of the reasonable, although I assumed that this idea is rich enough in content 
to invite the exclusion objection. Now, as has often been noted, there can be many versions of 
political liberalism depending on what idea of the reasonable it builds on (Nussbaum 2011; 
Besch 2012; Wall 2014; Billingham 2017). As a rule of thumb, the thinner in contested moral or 
political content this idea is, the more inclusive, or less exclusionary, APJ is–but the more 
inclusive it is, the more doubtful it must be that a political liberalism qualifies as reasonable in 
APJ‟s then-more-inclusive sense. Accordingly, an inclusively inclined political liberalism must 
strike a balance between a more inclusive interpretation of its commitment to equal discursive 
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respect and its other, lower-order substantive moral or political commitments. But so long as it 
attempts to reconcile these things by premising APJ on a non-trivial reasonableness threshold–
one that not every relevant person meets anyway–it invites the question whether APJ, in this 
more inclusive form, allocates only permissible purchase inequality. The issue of purchase 
inequality hence would be a matter of concern also for more inclusively inclined forms of 
actualist political liberalism. 
Of course, it does not stop here. Purchase inequality is a matter of concern for every 
conception of acceptability-based justification that aims to express, or model, equal discursive 
respect for actual people. On such conceptions, discursive practice must satisfy discursive 
equality. But once we recognize that discursive standing can be equal formally while being 
(objectionably) unequal substantively, it quickly becomes opaque what exactly discursive 
equality calls for.26 Thus, what distinguishes permissible from impermissible purchase 
inequality? Again, if this is open, it is open what it takes for practices of actualist public 
justification to model equal discursive respect. And so long as this is open, the ability of such 
practices to provide justification must be in doubt.  
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